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women cooperate with other women workers or, remembering how hard
they worked to get where they are, do they resent and try to sabotage
the progress of colleagues who appear to have had an easier time or
better preparation? Most important of all, women in every land and every
walk of life must begin to evaluate and use their own potential without
nurturing a "will to fail." This psychological handicap has been brought
to national attention by my contemporary at Bryn Mawr College, Dr.
Matina Homer, who observed:
• . .Among women, the anticipation of success, especially against
a male competitor, poses a threat to the sense of femininity and
self-esteem and serves as a potential basis for becoming socially re-
jected-in other words, the anticipation of success is anxiety pro-
ducing and as such inhibits otherwise positive achievement moti-
vation and behavior. In order to feel or appear more feminine,
women, especially those high in fear of success, disguise their
abilities and withdraw from the mainstream of thought, activism,
and achievement in our society . . . 5
Although Dr. Homer's studies were based on American women, my own
experiences while residing and visiting abroad suggest to me that
similar motivational blocks may be impeding foreign women from trying
to attain the levels of equal achievement which the law officially allows
them to reach. Women have a long, long way to go in attitude and
education before they can hope to reach their destination of full
equality.
Whatever the success or failings may be, the happy juxtaposition of
striving for adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment to the United
States Constitution and the International Women's Year of the United
Nations in 1975 can have one notable result: achieving a greater aware-
ness of the potential of women on the part of men and women through-
out the world.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF WOMEN IN REFERENCE TO
NATIONALITY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
By .Lung-chu Chen*
The task assigned to me is to address my remarks to Article 5 and
Article 6, paragraph 1(c) of the Declaration on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women. These provisions deal with the equal pro-
tection of women in reference to the right to nationality and to
freedom of movement. To paraphrase a traditional aphorism, in matters
of nationality it seems that in today's world the husband and the wife
are rapidly becoming two instead of one.
Id., 157, 159, 173.
* Yale Law School
The equal protection of women's right to nationality and to freedom of
movement is an important aspect of the emerging norm forbidding all dis-
crimination against women. The increasing global concern for outlawing
sex-based discrimination also builds upon and expresses a more general
norm of nondiscrimination. This norm seeks to ban all generic differ-
entiations among people in access to value shaping and sharing-for
reasons irrelevant to individual capabilities and contribution.
Despite marked improvement in status in recent decades, women
around the world still face deep, pervasive, and destructive discrimi-
nation. The concept of maleness or femaleness differs in different
cultures, and the specific tasks and responsibilities expected of the two
sexes vary from one society to another. However, the existence and
perpetuation of distinct sex roles, as dictated mostly by men, charac-
teristically result in male-dominated societies in which women are re-
garded as "the subordinate sex," "the second sex," "the weaker sex,"
or "the Other." The deprivations imposed on the ground of sex, both
historical and continuing, occur in all the value-institutional proc-
esses in the shaping and sharing of respect, power, enlightment,
well-being, wealth, skill, affection, and rectitude.
In specific reference to the nationality and movement of persons,
transnational as well as internal, men and women may of course both
suffer deprivations. But in many communities married women are made
to suffer additional deprivations under the inherited doctrine that "a
woman has no legal existence separate from her husband" who is "head
of the family." The acquisition, retention, change, or loss of nationality
of a married woman is often made to depend upon the marriage
relationship and automatically to follow that of her husband, in disregard
of her own wishes. Hence women are more apt to become victims
of statelessness or multiple nationality, the hardships of which scarcely
need elaboration here. In some communities where women are made
to lose civil capacity upon marriage, a married woman cannot obain
a passport to travel abroad or emigrate without her husband's permis-
sion. Severe restrictions on a married woman's freedom of movement may
further result from subjecting her to her husband's decision concern-
ing domicile and residence, without regard to her wishes or interests.
Nationality refers to the "characterizations" state elites make of in-
dividuals for the purposes of controlling and protecting them for all
their comprehensive concerns. In a world arena still largely state-or-
ganized, decisions about nationality may affect both the degree to
which the individual person has access to a protecting state in trans-
national interactions and the substantive content and quality of his or
her rights.
The right of nationality importantly affects the freedom of movement,
as the barriers to movement are erected along state lines. The degree of
freedom of movement is often conditioned by possession of a particular
nationality. These two are closely related. In this increasingly inter-
dependent world, freedom of movement both within the state and across
state boundaries is often essential to securing greater fulfillment of
all values.
The present inequitable distribution of people in relation to the re-
sources of the world results in significant measure from control of the
nationality and movement of people by nation-states. In a fundamental
sense what is at stake is the freedom of access of people to resources
around the world.
From the standpoint of scholarly observers identified with the whole
of humankind, it appears that the long-term policy most compatible with
an international law of human dignity would be one that seeks the utmost
freedom of choice in group affiliation, participation, and movement. The
individual's volition should be accorded the greatest possible expression
and respect in all the different decisions concerning nationality. In
particular, states should not be permitted to make arbitrary conferment
of nationality against the wishes of the individual, that is, upon grounds
unrelated to common interest. Nor should states be permitted arbitrarily,
as for purposes of discrimination, to deny or withhold nationality
sought or possessed by the individual.
Similarly, the utmost freedom of movement should be accorded the
individual. Meaningful freedom of movement must entail freedom to
leave and enter a territorial community, for temporary and permanent
purposes, and to stay, move, and reside within a territorial community.
Indeed, freedom of movement is indispensable for progress toward a non-
segregated world of human dignity. In such a nonsegregated world,
people, resources, and ideas can move freely to achieve optimum shap-
ing and sharing of all values, and the present disparities in the dis-
tribution of people in relation to resources could eventually be re-
dressed equitably around the globe.
It must of course be conceded that, given the present structure of the
world arena, states do share some common interests which may require
limitation of this preferred policy of the utmost individual freedom of
choice in reference to nationality and to movement of people. The pre-
ferred policy of freedom of choice needs to be balanced by such pub-
lic order considerations as the maintenance of security, maintenance of
harmonious relations between states, the critical needs of development,
health, morals, and so on for the particular community, taking into
account also the impact on neighboring and other states, the regional
community, and the world community.
The accommodation of common interest with individual freedom in a
particular instance would of course require a disciplined, contextual anal-
ysis, taking fully into account all the relevant factors in a particular
context. But one thing would appear crystal clear: that is, restrictions
in regard to nationality and to freedom of movement imposed upon the
ground of sex have no relation to rationality.
The group differentiation of individuals upon the basis of sex, for
the purpose of allocating access to value processes, including the right
to nationality and freedom of movement, is as inimical to the fundamental
policies of human dignity as group differentiation based upon ethnic
characteristics. It cannot promote freedom of choice for the individual
to allocate benefits and burdens in social process upon putative quali-
ties of "maleness" or "femaleness" rather than upon the actual char-
acteristics and capabilities of individual persons. Nor can such arbitrary
differentiation provide opportunity for the discovering, maturing, and ex-
ercising of latent talent, or for self-fulfillment or for contribution to ag-
gregate common interest.
The most rational general community policy requires the complete
emancipation of women, without countenancing the subordination of
men. Women, like men, should be accorded full freedom of choice and
protection in regard to nationality. Nationality should not be imposed
on women or taken away from them simply because they happen to
marry men of different nationality. Similarly, women, like men, should
be accorded the utmost freedom of movement from community to com-
munity, and within the community.
The drive toward eradication of sex-based discrimination, like that de-
signed to eliminate racial discrimination, has in recent decades been a
vital component of the trend toward a more general norm of non-
discrimination. From the United Nations Charter, through the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, to the International Covenants on Human
Rights, the broad, general norm of nondiscrimination has consistently
specified "sex" as among the impermissible grounds of differentiation.
Significantly, each of the two Covenants contains a special article on
the equality of the sexes, obliging the contracting states to "ensure
the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment" of all the pro-
tected rights. The general norm against sex-based discrimination is
further reinforced by a number of conventions, global and regional,
and other authoritative expressions oriented toward the protection of
women against particular vulnerabilities or in regard to particular values.
In specific reference to the nationality of women, nationality laws
differ widely in terms of the effect of marriage. Basically speaking,
there are two opposing principles governing the law on the nationality
of married women. The traditional principle is the unity of the family,
according to which the nationality of all members of the family-mother,
father, and children under age-should be the same, in order not to cause
split loyalty within the family. The second principle, based on equality
of the sexes, honors the freedom of a marr-ied woman to choose
her own nationality. Under the interplay of these two basic principles,
municipal laws about the nationality of married women can be divided
into three categories: (1) The nationality of the wife follows automat-
ically that of the husband; (2) Although marriage to a man of a different
nationality affects the nationality of the wife, provisions are made to
avoid statelessness or double nationality of the woman; and (3) The
woman has the right to choose her own nationality and marriage will
not affect the nationality of the wife. Thus, according to a recent
UN study, an alien woman automatically acquires the nationality of her
husband upon marriage under the law of twenty-eight states; under the
law of sixty-eight states, the alien wife may on certain conditions
acquire the nationality of the husband; and under the law of twelve
states marriage of an alien woman to a national has no effect whatever
on her nationality.
Just as a woman may automatically or othervise acquire the nationality
of her alien husband upon marriage, she may automatically or other-
wise lose her original nationality as a consequence of marriage to a
foreign national. According to the same UN ,study, a woman auto-
matically loses her nationality upon marriage to an alien under the
law of six states; under the law of 18 states, a woman will automati-
cally lose her original nationality upon acquisition of the nationality of
her husband; under the law of the overwhelming majority of the states
(84 in number), marriage to an alien husband will not result in automatic
loss of nationality.
For the sake of family unity and undivided allegiance, it was once a
very popular practice that a woman automatically lost her original
nationality and acquired instead her husband's upon marriage to a
foreign national. Another justification was phrased in terms of a theory
of "implicit consent," i.e., a woman, in marrying an alien, implicitly
consents to abandon her original nationality.
From the perspective of human rights, marriage should have no auto-
matic effect on the nationality of either the wife or the husband. An
alien woman, in marrying a national, does not necessarily signify her
intention formally to identify with the state of which her husband is
a national or to sever ties with the state of her nationality. In keeping
with the growing demand for equality of men and women, the trend
is away from the principle that a married woman's nationality automat-
ically follows that of her husband.
Furthermore, as a manifestation of the policy of minimizing stateless-
ness, the decisive trend has been movement away from automatic loss
of a woman's nationality upon marriage to an alien. Thus, the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws makes the loss of nationality of a woman married to a foreign
national, by virtue either of the marriage or of her husband's change
of nationality during marriage, conditional on "her acquiring the nation-
ality of the husband." Similarly, the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness of 1961 makes the loss of a woman's nationality, be-
cause of marriage or her husband's loss of nationality, "conditioned
upon [her] possession or acquisition of another nationality."
These prescriptions, though protective, are less than adequate. A
critical focus in the ongoing worldwide movement of women's libera-
tion has been equality of the sexes regarding nationality. This prin-
ciple is perceived to be the fundamental, positive answer to the ques-
tion of statelessness of married women. This positive policy first found
concrete expression in the international arena in 1933, when the Monte-
video Convention on the Nationality of Women declared that "no
distinction" shall be "based on sex as regards nationality" and that
"neither matrimony nor its dissolution affects the nationality of the
husband or wife."
More recently, in 1957, the Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women was adopted by the UN General Assembly in an effort to "elim-
inate the automatic effect on the nationality of the wife of marriage,
its dissolution, or the change of nationality by the husband." The
principal thrust of the Convention is to substitute the principle of equality
between the sexes for the anachronistic doctrine of "the unity of family."
The Convention, going beyond such existing prescriptions as embodied
in the 1930 Hague Convention on Nationality, stipulates emphatically,
in Article 1, that
Neither the celebration nor the dissolution of a marriage between
one of its nationals and an alien, nor the change of nationality by
the husband during marriage, shall automatically affect the nation-
ality of the wife.
Article 2 states:
Neither the voluntary acquisition of the nationality of another State
nor the renunciation of its nationality by one of its nationals shall
prevent the retention of its nationality by the wife of such national.
The Convention fuirther provides, in Article 3, that "specially privileged
naturalization procedures" be made available for a wife who wishes
to acquire the nationality of her husband. The Declaration on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women of 1967 reaffirms this
policy in Article 5:
Women shall have the same rights as men to acquire, change or
retain their nationality. Marriage to an alien shall not automatically
affect the nationality of the wife either by rendering her stateless
or by forcing upon her the nationality of her husband.
Turning to freedom of movement, community expectations have found
unequivocal expression in transnational prescriptions. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in Article 13 proclaims that "Everyone
has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each State" and that "Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country." The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states in Article 12 that "Every-
one lawfilly within the territory of a State shall, within that territory,
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence;" that "Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own;" and that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of the right to enter his own country." Comparable provisions are
found in the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 2 of Protocol
No. 4) and in the American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 22).
These provisions are intended for "everyone," regardless of sex. They
apply to women as well as men; they apply to married women as well
as unmarried women. The designation "his" used in these provisions is
employed in generic reference to every person; it in no way purports
to exclude the female sex from the purview of the protection.
To highlight the basic unity of humankind in freedom of movement,
the Uppsala colloquium was convened in June 1972 to formulate de-
tailed principles for guiding and facilitating the liberal application of
the freedom to leave and to return. After spelling out these guiding
principles and permissible limitations, the Uppsala Declaration in Article
17 underscores that these principles and limitations be applied without
discrimination on the basis of sex, marriage, or other grounds.
Without going into detail, it suffices to say that to the extent freedom
of movement is protected on the transnational level, it is imperative
that such protection be extended equally to women as well as men. This
policy is unequivocably stated in Article 6(1) (c) of the Declaration
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women:
Without prejudice to the safeguarding of the unity and the harmony
of the family, which remains the basic unit of any society, all appro-
priate measures, particularly legislative measures, shall be taken to
ensure to women, married or unmarried, equal rights with men in
the field of civil law, and in particular: . . .
(c) The same rights as men with regard to the law on the movement
of persons.
The Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women, currently under consideration by the Commission
on the Status of Women, has been accorded priority by the United Nations
in 1975, this International Women's Year. Whatever final form this Con-
vention may take, its substantive content is not likely to vary greatly
from that of the version presently before the Commission.
In the matter of nationality, the Draft Convention, like the Declara-
tion, seeks to protect women from the bondage and hardships caused
by involuntary acquisition, change, retention, or loss of nationality,
which automatically result from marriage to an alien husband. Drawing
upon the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women and
Article 5 of the Declaration, the Draft Convention provides a detailed for-
mulation in Article 9(1):
States Parties shall grant women the same rights as men to acquire,
change or retain their nationality and shall require, in particular,
that neither marriage of a woman to, nor dissolution of her marriage
from, an alien nor the change of nationality by her alien husband
during marriage shall automatically change her nationality, render
her stateless or force upon her the nationality of her husband.
The second paragraph of this article urges the grant of nationality to
alien women married to nationals "through specially privileged natural-
ization procedures," as distinguished from those ordinarily applicable
to aliens in general. With regard to freedom of movement, Article 15(4) of
the Draft Convention specifically includes "the freedom to choose
residence" in the protection regarding the "movement of persons."
The authoritative formulation of particular human rights may at first
